Before discussing my three country case studies in more detail, I will briefly, for the purpose of contextualisation, situate gay marriage campaigns within the context of a global LGBT rights agenda, and canvass some of the existing critiques of these campaigns. The focus of this discussion is less on the national and transnational social movements themselves than on the gradual institutionalisation of LGBT rights discourse within the UN, as it is this UN-isation of LGBT rights that has provided the political and discursive framework within which national governments have placed their ' LGBT equality' agendas. It is well beyond my brief here to retrace the entire history of the global LGBT rights agenda (or indeed, of the shifts in nomenclature from 'gay,' to 'gay and lesbian,' to 'lesbian and gay,' to the inclusion of 'bisexual,' 'transgender' and occasionally 'intersex' and even 'queer'). Its beginnings can, however, roughly be LGBT people are not isolated individuals. We fall in love, and establish relationships and families-however configured. For many of us, these relationships and families are the most important parts of our lives. Unless they are legally recognized, our rights to equality and dignity cannot be fully secured … We therefore demand that all governments that have not yet done so reform family law in order to reflect the growing diversity of family life, -by opening-up legal marriage to same-sex couples, -introducing similar partnership rights for all unmarried couples, and -ensuring equal access for all to every option for parenthood. ( 'Everyone has the right to found a family, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. Families exist in diverse forms. No family may be subjected to discrimination on the basis of the sexual orientation or gender identity of any of its members' (Yogyakarta Principles 2006 ). This sentence is followed by a number of dot-points that articulate parenting and couple rights.
The Montreal Declaration and the Yogyakarta Principles remain firmly within the framework of the family as codified within the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Not only do human rights include the right to marry and found a family, but the UN Declaration also tells us that the family is 'the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State' (Article 16, para. 3). The Yogyakarta Principles may include a nod to 'diverse forms' of family but the idea of family itself, aligned to the heteropatriarchal nuclear-family model of modern capitalist nation-states, is not at any time questioned.
The two documents were nonetheless considered a landmark in advancing the global
LGBT rights agenda, an agenda about which the reformist-assimilationist bases, and the 'alphabet-soup' grouping of all 'alternative' sexual and gender identities, have not been seriously questioned either by the UN and other inter-or supra-national rights bodies, democratic nation-states or gay rights organisations. This 'homonormalisation' did not, however, prevent the Yogyakarta Principles from meeting with strong opposition from a number of UN members when they were presented at the UN Human Rights Council on other. In her analysis of 'homonationalism,' Jasbir Puar argues that in tying 'the recognition of homosexual subjects, both legally and representationally,' to nationalist and imperialist agendas, thus constructing a specific 'biopolitical' profile of the gay citizen, Western homonormativist assimilation helps to reinforce the Othering of those beings deemed unacceptable within these biopolitics (Puar 2006: 9 ff) . The 'Muslim world' becomes once again essentialised as a-historic, brutal and the anathema of progress and modernity. Much as 'women's rights' were used as a moral justification for the 'War on Terror' in 2001 to 2003 (Delphy 2002 Winter 2002a; Winter 2006; Eisenstein 2007) , 'gay rights,' defined homonormatively, have become the new indicator of Western moral superiority. We have gay marriage, gay businesses, gay TV shows, while they have stonings, rapes and honour killings. For Puar, writing within a US post-9/11 context, 'they' is the Muslim other, although the Othering does not stop there.
Yet, the fact remains that the countries most fervently opposed to any sort of rights for gay people are those where religion-Islam but also Christianity-and state are the most heavily imbricated. Homosexuality is, for example, illegal in Christian-dominated Uganda and Cameroon as well as in many Caribbean and Pacific-Island states that are also Christian dominated. It remains illegal in 77 countries and is punishable by death in five of these as well as in Muslim-controlled regions of Nigeria. On a national level, in 2013 Nigeria became one of a number of countries to regress on gay and lesbian rights, adopting on 30 May a law condemning any gay or lesbian couples who marry to fourteen years in prison, with a ten-year sentence for gay and lesbian couples who merely show affection in public. With this sort of brutal opposition, largely fuelled by religious lobbies, it is not difficult to understand why gay marriage has become an international cause célèbre and it becomes difficult to argue against it if one wishes to be considered progressive.
It is, however, arguable, even demonstrable, that notwithstanding the vicious opposition of governments such as that of Nigeria, marriage is not at the top of the agenda in countries where even to exist as gay or lesbian is punishable by death, prison, corporal punishment, fines and/or various other forms of legally sanctioned economic discrimination and social ostracism. Yet our understandings of human rights are heavily influenced by positivist thinking: according to such thinking, human rights are incrementally obtained in a linear pathway of progress that inevitably moves forward and upward. The legal recognition of gay marriage and family, as the Montreal Declaration argues, has come to be seen as an essential (final?) step in 'fully securing' gay and lesbian 'dignity and equality,' and thus a marker of the 'advanced' state of democracies. That gay marriage is not necessarily the most pressing matter in Uganda or Saudi Arabia does not, for its advocates, mean that it does not represent the finality of gay rights for citizens of those countries. According to such arguments, Uganda and Saudi Arabia have simply not 'advanced' that far yet.
To set up gay marriage as the pinnacle of recognition of gay 'dignity and equality,' as per Article 16 of the 1948 UN Declaration, is to frame 'LGBT rights' in a particular way. I am not here arguing for culturally-relativist definitions of human rights (such as the 1981 Islamic Declaration), as a counter to the presumed 'Western hegemony' of human rights philosophy. I do believe it is possible to identify a common humanity and fundamental needs of every human being, whatever particular approach one takes: human rights, human capabilities (Nussbaum 2000) These codes are so deeply ingrained in our cultures as to be considered natural (Winter 2002b ). Gender, for example, is considered a 'normal' social division and basis for social organisation, and to be properly gendered one has to exhibit certain physical and psychological characteristics. The politics of transgender has largely been built on that premise: that gender is a normal part of social relations, and if one has the misfortune to be born into the 'wrong' gender, then this should be surgically changed. The idea that social relations might be much improved, and 'dignity and equality' more wholly realised, by doing away entirely with the concept of gender, has little currency in global
LGBT rights conversations.
Indeed, it appears to be inconceivable, so overwhelming is the necessity to have a gender-on every identity document, every form one fills out, through every act of selfidentification-as is the necessity to be situated in relation to official coupledom.
Citizenship is in fact not only sexual but also marital-as David Cameron, cited at the beginning of this article, clearly reminds us. To be married-for both heterosexuals and homosexuals-is to better conform to what it is to be fully human, as encoded in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights among other documents. Families are at the base of social fabric; they are protected by states through legislation and cultural norms. To be part of a family is to more fully exist. To be part of a legally recognised couple is to more fully exist. To procreate or to adopt children is to more fully exist. In doing so, one conserves 'the ties that bind us' as a nation, as David Cameron reminds us.
The implicit flipside of this equation is that not to be married and procreate means that one less fully exists, is socially, culturally and emotionally deprived and indeed deficient.
Will the unmarried and childless gay man or lesbian become the new pariah of a homonormalised nation?
As pointed out by Puar and by others such as Alexandra Chasin (2000), who analyses the impact of capitalist consumerism on gay politics, the national 'us' is defined by elites and their social, financial and cultural capital. As a core demand of the global
LGBT rights movement, gay marriage remains the province of liberal and largely secularised capitalist democracies. As a sign of gay normalcy, it is also, in this global convenience. Also, in some cases, as has been noted in relation to France's new law, existing bilateral agreements concerning which country's law is to be observed concerning recognition of marriage can work against transnational couples (Trouillard 2013 ). Moreover, gay marriage does nothing to address the ongoing issue of asylum for lesbians and gay men for whom liberal democracies are more often than not closely guarded fortresses (Jansen & Spijkerboer 2011; Winter 2012) . Even as these democracies open their doors (just a crack) to gay asylum seekers, they reinforce both the reification of the cultures and countries of origin as a-historic and backward, and the construction of a performative 'gay' identity aligned to a Western stereotypical model (Luibhéid 2008; Millbank 2009 How, asks Ilgin Yorukoglu, writing about Turkish gay minorities in Germany, 'do we explain this double standard, one that encourages tolerance and invites gay tourists and the "creative class" to the table on the one hand, while calling for stricter border controls to curb immigration on the other?' (Yorukoglu 2010: 435) .
More broadly, as I suggested at the beginning of this article, actions by governments in favour of gay marriage cost nothing; this is particularly the case for left-leaning governments for which the religious right is not usually a key constituency. On the contrary, in fact, support for gay marriage improves governments' popularity among a significant electoral demographic, and even right-wing governments who may be assumed to be more attentive to religious hardliners have learned to play to popular opinion, as we will see presently in the case of the new Abbott government in Australia.
Support for liberal-democratic social justice issues like gay marriage is also useful in deflecting attention from other measures that are far less likely to advance gay, or anyone's, human rights, as we will see in looking at all three case studies.
Argentina
In 2010, Argentina became the first country in Latin America, and the tenth in the world, to legalise same-sex marriage. This move has resulted in the qualification of Argentina, on numerous online media and encyclopedia sites, as the most 'advanced' Latin American country as concerns gay rights. The Senate approved the law on 14 July, by 33 votes to 27, with three abstentions, after a fourteen-hour debate. The vote was televised live and Peronist president Cristina Kirchner also signed off on the law on national television on 22 July. According to an article in the British press, five hundred marriages were celebrated between that date and 25 December (that number increased to 6,000 by June 2012), and some three hundred suppliers were explicitly targeting the gay marriage market. Gay (male?) spouses-to-be were reported to be much bigger spenders than their heterosexual counterparts, by some 30 percent (Kelly 2012) . A 'gay marriage' tourism industry has even developed, oriented primarily around Buenos Aires, the 'gay capital' of South America, although some tourism websites also provide advice on regional Argentinian destinations such as Rosario, Mendoza, Bariloche and Ushuaia.
Yet some commentators have noted that gay marriage, often framed, as I have suggested above, as the culmination of progress on gay rights, has in Argentina lain more at the beginning than at the end of the road. Discrimination and violence against gay men and lesbians in regional Argentina-anywhere, in fact, outside the cosmopolitan porteño culture of central Buenos Aires-continues virtually unimpeded, and gay marriage has done little if anything to alter this. The extent of the problem was brought home some months prior to the passage of the gay marriage law by a murder case that has become a cause célèbre among LGBT rights activists in Argentina (Dillon 2011; Greenfield 2011 ). On 7 March 2010, 27-year old Natalia 'Pepa' Gaitán, a highly visible and butch-looking lesbian living in the city of Córdoba, was murdered by her girlfriend's stepfather, Daniel Toledo, who objected to his stepdaughter leaving home to leave with Gaitán (Greenfield 2011) . A wave of local protest ensued, with graffiti and posters denouncing this murder as a hate crime. As lawyer Natalia Milisenda put it: 'this is a case of gender violence, which is not recognised in public policies, but which victimises many lesbian women, simply for the fact that they are women and that they are freely exercising their sexuality' (cited in Vinter 2010 ). Yet the court refused to acknowledge that Gaitán was targeted as a lesbian and as a woman refusing to conform to feminine stereotypes, and Toledo was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment for 'domestic violence' (Greenfield 2011) . The following year, the 8 March international women's day protest in Córdoba commemorated Gaitán's murder, focusing on femicide and other forms of violence against women including lesbians (Qualiafolk 2011).
Other forms of violence against women continue to be a grave problem in Argentina. A few days after the gay marriage law was signed, there was a large demonstration in Buenos Aires in favour of fully legalising abortion, which is subject to strict restrictions under the 1921 Penal Code, still in force. The Code qualifies abortion as a 'crime against life,' and allows it in only two exceptional cases: where there is immediate risk to the mother's life and in the case of rape of a mentally incompetent woman (that is, developmentally disabled or mentally ill). In practice, however, even in these cases some doctors will raise conscientious objections and refuse to perform the abortions.
One is led to ask why, in these two areas that are both related to the idea of sexual citizenship and sexual rights, and that have historically met with resistance for the same reasons: 'nature, morals and "common good"' (Rawson 2012: 177, my The National Front, combined these 'two Frances' into a message aimed at claiming the moral high ground in the latest battle for the Republic.
The Manif pour tous expresses its opposition to gay marriage as follows:
The 'Marriage for all' bill radically overhauls the Civil code by systematically removing the words 'husband,' 'wife,' 'father' and 'mother' in favour of asexual and undifferentiated terms (notably 'parents'). This bill thus intends to legally remove sexual difference and calls into question the foundation of human identity: sexual difference and the filiation that results from it. Venner's action was certainly spectacular, and as Greens Deputy Noël Mamère put it in his own blog a few days later, it 'adds to the rising power of a grassroots fascism that is corrupting much of the French right' (Mamère 2013) .
The force of the opposition to gay marriage in France, and the sort of symbolism and rhetoric it has deployed, makes it very difficult to take a critical attitude towards the 
Australia
What, then, of Australia, which as noted above was a world leader in recognising samesex relationships for the purpose of migration, and yet is the only of the three case study countries in this article to resist recognition of gay marriage? In the first gay immigration test case in 1982, lawyer Betty Hounslow based her arguments on an interpretation of the 'compassionate and humanitarian' provisions in the then immigration law. It was also around that test case that the Gay and Lesbian Immigration
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Task Force (GLITF) was founded in Sydney, and started both lobbying for changes in the law and providing legal advice and support for gay and lesbian binational couples.
Notwithstanding the efforts of the GLITF and others to have laws introduced that reflected the reality and diversity of lesbian and gay couples, the procedures that the In Australia, then, perhaps more than elsewhere, the campaign for gay marriage largely took the form from the outset of 'how dare you say we can't,' perhaps rather more than 'we really, really want this in order to be considered full citizens.' Nonetheless, Australian Marriage Equality cites polls that place support for gay marriage in Australia at 64 percent, with the proportion rising to 81 percent among 18-24 year olds (AME website), and AME national convenor Rodney Croome anticipates mass gay marriage travel to neighbouring New Zealand (cited in Packham 2013 ). This will surely be as good for the New Zealand tourism industry as it has been for the porteño one in Argentina. AME also frames marriage equality as being 'about extending the privileges already enjoyed by the majority to an excluded minority' (AME website Perhaps we are not as cosmopolitan as we think.
Conclusion
The campaigns for gay marriage, and the rhetoric with which governments-and their oppositions-embrace or refuse it, highlight the importance of marriageability for acceptance into the national community and for recognition as fully human. The nonmarriageable, according to Australian Marriage Equality, are considered 'second class citizens,' deprived of the 'protection by society and the state' that the United Nations advocates for formally recognised family units.
Gay marriage campaigns have thus been framed as in the interest of gay men and lesbians, in providing an 'in' to this marital citizenship. Ultimately, however, marriage does not protect individuals or family members anywhere near as much as it protects the state. Marriage and family are regulators of social relations, creating structures in which it is in fact impossible for individuals to become the free and equal citizens that the lofty rhetoric of democracies tells us we should be. More importantly, marriage and the family are the primary vehicles of socioeconomic and cultural reproduction in the nation's image.
The least threatening thing to our heteropatriarchal white-Western capitalist states that gay rights activists can do, then, is to demand to marry and have families. As Shannon Gilreath has put it, if it values 'only that which is paradigmatically straight,' the gay movement will have 'uncritically compromised its moral independence' (Gilreath 2011: 229 and 232) . As a result, we will all have become bound anew by the 'ties' of a heterosexist nation, and stigmatised anew if we seek to undo them.
